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Abstract 
Mental representation and transformation of spatial information is often 
examined with mental rotation tasks, which require deciding whether a rotated image is 
the same or the mirror version of an upright image. Recent research with infants shows 
early discrimination of objects from mirror image versions. However, even at age 4, 
many children perform near chance level on more standard measures. Similar age 
discrepancies can be observed in other domains, including perspective taking, theory of 
mind, and intuitive physics. These paradoxical results raise the questions of how 
performance relates to competence, and how to conceptualize developmental change. 
There may be a common underlying mechanism: the development of the ability to 
imagine things and mentally transform them in a prospective fashion.  
 
 
Keywords: cognitive development, mental rotation, theory of mind, intuitive physics, 
perspective taking, simulation
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One of the most impressive skills of the human species is an ability to represent and 
mentally transform the shapes of objects. People can generate mental images of two-
dimensional shapes or three-dimensional objects, and can transform them in various 
ways, e.g., rotating, bending, or folding them [1]. Such flexible representations are vital 
for making predictions regarding the positions of moving objects, for example to avoid 
collisions when crossing a street. They also allow for anticipating the effects of actions 
when manipulating objects or using tools. Furthermore, the ability to perform mental 
spatial transformations predicts number and math skills [2,3]. Thus, determining the 
origins and development of mental transformations is a central and topical problem in 
cognitive science, with translational implications for intervention. However, research on 
this issue has led to paradoxical findings, with infants showing remarkable abilities but 
young children failing on seemingly similar tasks. In the present article we put these 
contrasting results in context with similar findings in other domains, and suggest an 
underlying mechanism. 
Age Discrepancies in Mental Transformation  
Much of the previous research on mental transformation has focused on a 
specific kind of spatial transformation, termed mental rotation (MR), which refers to 
imagining a rotational movement of an object (or array of objects) in 2- or 3-
dimensional space. In a classic MR task [4], participants must decide whether a rotated 
image is the same as a comparison image, or its mirror image. In developmental 
research, this paradigm has been adapted for the use with children and even infants, with 
oddly contrasting results. 
Studies with Preschoolers and Young Children 
Running head: DEVELOPMENT OF MENTAL TRANSFORMATION ABILITIES 4 
Although Marmor [5,6] found that 4- to 5-year-olds were able to perform MR, 
there has been controversy about her conclusions [7]. A follow-up study employing the 
same procedure with different stimuli failed to replicate Marmor’s results [8]. Other 
studies showed that at 4 to 5 years, many children performed at chance, and only few 
showed signs of MR [9-11]. Even efforts to simplify the tasks by using a touch screen or 
presenting simple and engaging stimuli have failed to demonstrate MR in 3-year-olds, 
let alone younger children [12,13]. Some other tasks that have been used with toddlers 
and young children can be solved by using feature strategies and may not require MR 
(Box 1).  
Infant Studies 
In sharp contrast to research with preschoolers, recent research has shown that 
infants can discriminate mirror images despite differences in orientation [14-21]. For 
example, in two such studies [14,15], infants saw an asymmetrical object being moved 
straight down behind an occluder. When the occluder was lowered it revealed either the 
same object (possible event) or its mirror image (impossible event) in one of five 
different orientations (Figure 1). Infants had been shown beforehand that the backside of 
the object looked different, so the mirror image was impossible. Six-month-olds looked 
longer at the impossible than at the possible outcomes, suggesting that they 
discriminated mirror images. Other studies using similar violation-of-expectation 
paradigms showed that infants looked longer at incongruent than at congruent outcome 
orientations of objects undergoing a hidden rotation [22-24].  
These findings suggest that infants possess fairly sophisticated abilities, yet 
much older children struggle with MR tasks. Thus, it is unclear whether infant and 
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preschool tasks measure the same ability, how performance on these tasks relates to 
competence, and how to conceptualize mechanisms of developmental change. Adding to 
the heterogeneous picture, sex differences in MR seem to be robust in adults, but have 
only rarely been found before 9 years of age (Box 2). However, there are various 
potential reasons for the observed performance differences, as paradigms used with 
infants differ from those used with children in several ways. 
Task Differences 
Presentation of Motion or Multiple Views 
In MR paradigms used with adults [4] and children [5,6,9,25-27], stimuli are 
typically static images in single orientations. In contrast, infant often see objects in 
actual physical rotation before the test [16,17,20,21,23,24], or in multiple static 
orientations [18,19]. This may allow infants to extrapolate motion or to interpolate 
between familiar views [28]. Indeed, research has demonstrated that infants are better at 
recognizing objects that are presented in motion compared to static views [29]. 
However, showing motion or multiple views can now be ruled out as the sole 
explanation for early success, in light of recent evidence suggesting that 6-month-olds 
are able to discriminate an object from its tilted mirror version, even after being 
familiarized to the upright object only [14,15]. Nevertheless, presenting an object in 
motion or multiple views may lower task difficulty, causing infants as young as 3 to 4 
months to succeed [16,18,23,24]. 
Presentation of Outcome 
Another task difference lies in the fact that infants typically are confronted with 
congruent and incongruent outcomes of rotational events, whereas children have to 
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predict the outcome [30]. Thus, infants’ reasoning may be limited to recognizing 
incongruities retrospectively, and they may simply react to violations of basic principles 
such as object solidity and continuity. In contrast, children’s tasks require prospective 
spatial transformations that may be more cognitively demanding, as they involve 
mentally simulating a rotational event and inhibiting current sensory input [31].  
Differences in Measurement 
Tasks in infancy research use dependent variables such as looking time, eye 
movement, ERP, and heart rate. Such variables may tap different cognitive 
competencies than dependent variables that require explicit judgment, conscious choice, 
or decision-making. Moreover, older children generally must perform a motor response 
that may increase cognitive load, leading to a cognition/action trade-off [32]. Indeed, 
discrepancies between reports of amazing abilities in infants and profound lacks in older 
children are not confined to MR, but are also found in other cognitive domains. 
Age Discrepancies in Other Domains 
Perspective Taking 
Perspective taking refers to the ability to adopt someone else’s spatial 
perspective. It is logically akin to MR, as it involves mentally rotating oneself into 
another vantage point. But despite this similarity, perspective taking and MR are 
dissociated in various behavioral and neural ways [33-35]. Developmental research has 
shown that perspective taking emerges around 4 or 5 years but improves considerably 
through age 8 [36]. Even though preschoolers perform better on tasks in which 
responses are not influenced by conflicting frames of reference [37], they still make 
many egocentric errors. 
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In contrast, infants as young as 14 months succeeded in perspective-taking tasks 
that measured looking times [38,39]. For example, when asked to help an experimenter 
find an object, 24-month-olds inferred whether an object was visible or hidden from the 
experimenter’s point of view, and helped in obtaining the occluded object [38].  
Theory of Mind 
The development of metacognitive knowledge, or Theory of Mind [40] is often 
assessed by a false belief task [41]. For example, suppose a character (Maxi) aims to 
retrieve chocolate that has been relocated in his absence. Asked where Maxi will look 
for the chocolate, all of the 3- to 4-year-olds and almost half of the 4- to 6-year-olds say 
that Maxi will look in the new place (where children knew the chocolate is) rather than 
in the original place (where Maxi would falsely believe the chocolate is). Such results 
suggest that it is not until 4 to 6 years of age that the ability to represent another 
person’s epistemic state emerges. 
On the other hand, infant studies have suggested an early ability to attribute 
complex mental states and false beliefs to others [40,42]. For example, a study that 
followed the logic of the Maxi-study [43] showed that 15-month-olds looked reliably 
longer if an experimenter searched for a toy in a place where it was relocated to in her 
absence, as compared to when she searched where she had previously observed the toy 
being hidden. 
Intuitive Physics 
Another domain where age discrepancies have been found concerns children’s 
understanding of the physical world [30]. A large body of research revealed that young 
infants show a stunning sophistication in their understanding of basic physical principles 
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[44]. Spelke and colleagues [45] showed that infants as young as 2½ months have a 
sense of solidity and continuity, and respond with prolonged looking if a solid object 
passes through or jumps over an obstacle. However, contrasting findings pointed to a 
surprising lack of such knowledge in 2- and 3-year-olds (e.g., [46-48]).  
To investigate these age discrepancies within a single study, Hood, Cole-Davies 
and Dias [49] tested preschoolers on an observation task as well as a search task. 
Children watched a ball rolling behind a screen that partly occluded a solid barrier. 
Whereas children’s looking times suggested that they detected violations of solidity 
(i.e., the ball seemingly passed through the barrier), this sensitivity was not associated 
with successful search behavior.  
Conceptualizing Development 
How can these paradoxical age discrepancies be explained? One possible 
interpretation is to assume a U-shaped developmental trajectory (see Figure 2, Panel A), 
in which infants possess an early ability that is temporarily lost and reacquired later. 
However, as discussed above with regards to MR, infant paradigms (Paradigm1) and 
paradigms used with older children (Paradigm2) differ in many ways. Hence, we should 
also consider an alternative trajectory (Figure 2, Panel B), with two possible versions. In 
one scenario, Paradigm1 and Paradigm2 measure entirely different abilities. In a more 
parsimonious scenario, Paradigm1 and Paradigm2 tap the same ability on different levels 
of sophistication. In the case of MR, further research is needed do distinguish between 
these two scenarios; in particular, finding a method for indexing the time infants take to 
mentally rotate a stimulus (in analogy to adults’ response times) would advance our 
understanding. 
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In the domain of intuitive physics, Hespos and Baillargeon [50] found that 
developmental patters observed in looking-time paradigms also hold for reaching tasks, 
supporting the view that looking-time and reaching tasks tap the same physical 
knowledge, rendering a U-shaped development unlikely. The notion that different tasks 
may tap the same knowledge at different levels of abstraction is also supported by the 
fact that adults who show misconceptions about physical laws in their explicit 
judgments are nevertheless able to perform mental simulations and behave in 
accordance with the same laws (e.g., [51-53]).  
With regards to theory of mind, Perner and Roessler [40] assume that early 
sensitivity is shown in implicit “online tasks”, in which engagement with ongoing 
events reflects expectations, whereas traditional tasks require explicit judgment and an 
intentional switch of perspectives. For perspective taking, there is a general agreement 
that the ability can be measured at different levels of sophistication [36]. Infant tasks 
typically measure Level 1 perspective taking, which require an understanding of what 
another person sees – an inference that can be made by tracing the line of sight. Older 
children fail on Level 2 tasks, requiring a more sophisticated understanding of how a 
person sees the environment. Thus, in line with the assumed trajectory in Panel B of 
Figure 2, children’s tasks assess perspective taking at a higher level, which presumably 
requires mentally assuming someone’s viewpoint while ignoring one’s actual perceptual 
input. 
Common Mechanism? 
Taken together, contrasting results of seemingly sophisticated competencies in 
infancy and surprisingly low performance in preschoolers can be found in several 
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cognitive domains. Some of these domains appear closely related, such as perspective 
taking and theory of mind; others do not seem to have very much in common, such as 
knowing how a ball rolls and reasoning about another person’s beliefs. Furthermore, it is 
remarkable that similar age dissociations are found not only in areas such as intuitive 
physics and theory of mind, which have conceptual content, but also for spatial 
transformations that are generally considered to be analog and perception-like in nature 
[54]. However, the findings of similar dissociations across cognitive domains may be 
informative, indicating a common underlying mechanism. In particular, the fundamental 
ability to transform mental representations may be instrumental in understanding other 
people’s perspectives, mental states, and physical events [9,55].  
A great deal of research has provided evidence for mental simulation as a 
strategy to solve mechanical and dynamic physical problems (e.g., [52]). Such mental 
simulations may tap tacit or implicit knowledge about physical constraints such as 
object constancy, solidity, or inertia that may be present early in life. Schwartz and 
Black [56] argued that people may fall back on imagistic mental models in situations 
where they do not have adequate explicit knowledge. However, although implicit 
knowledge may be activated during mental simulation, it may not be consciously 
accessible or open to reflection. Wilson [57] assumes that these simulations piggyback 
on mental structures that originally evolved for perception or action and can now be run 
“off-line,” dissociated from actual physical inputs and outputs (cf. [58] for ideas on 
conceptualizing such decoupling). This notion is in line with findings that MR ability is 
closely linked to motor activity and motor development (Box 3).  
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Mental simulation has also been used to explain the mechanisms underlying 
theory of mind. Whereas theory theorists posit that children acquire a conceptual 
understanding of the mind, simulation theorists claim that we can infer what another 
person thinks, knows, or plans by mentally simulating their situations [59]. According to 
simulation theory, we form predictions about our own or other’s actions by engaging in 
a kind of “pretend-play”, while suppressing behavioral output.  
Developmental progress in the understanding of other people’s minds may 
therefore be due to increasing imaginative skills, allowing children to simulate more 
complex situations [9]. Others [60] have postulated that self-projection may be a 
common mechanism underlying theory of mind, prospection, episodic memory, and 
navigation, with all of these cognitive abilities relying on autobiographical information. 
Here, we go a step further, proposing that the ability to flexibly change mental 
representations may be even more fundamental, also allowing for the anticipation of 
non-biological motion and physical events. 
Conclusion 
Developmental research has shown apparently sophisticated abilities in infants 
across multiple domains, whereas older children struggle with seemingly similar tasks. 
Recent infant studies in the domain of mental rotation have demonstrated similar 
patterns of paradoxical age discrepancies, providing new support for the claim that 
mental simulation may be key to successful performance in many cognitive domains. 
Whereas content, modality, and simulated perceptual inputs may vary across domains, 
the ability to flexibly transform mental representations regardless of the sensed, known, 
Running head: DEVELOPMENT OF MENTAL TRANSFORMATION ABILITIES 12 
or believed actuality may be a common mechanism of fundamental importance for a 
host of cognitive abilities and their development.  
In line with a simulation account, Perner and Roessler [40] note that early 
sensitivity is only observed in spontaneous and immediate responses, suggesting that 
implicit knowledge is available only briefly after stimulus presentation. Thus, mental 
simulations may initially be too short-lived and weak to guide complex verbal or action 
responses. Along with developing mental transformation abilities they may become 
stronger, more resistant to decay, and hence more behaviorally relevant. Furthermore, in 
accordance with the notion of graded representations [61], different tasks may be more 
or less likely to evoke mental simulations, and therefore require different 
representational strength. Developmental progression in mental transformation ability, 
possibly along with growing executive functions [31,62] that allow for ignoring 
perceptual input and inhibiting motor output, may enable more complex and more 
sustained simulations of alternative scenarios, raising the abilities in these cognitive 
domains to a higher level. 
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Box 1. Distinctive Stimulus Features 
Some researchers have used manipulation tasks to study MR in toddlers between 
2 and 5 years of age [3,63,64]. The goal of these tasks was to manually rotate an object 
into the same orientation as a reference object, to its upright (canonical) position, or so 
that it would fit through an aperture. The assumption has been that toddlers mentally 
rotate the object first to form an (efficient) action plan. However, it can be argued that 
toddlers do not need MR to succeed in these tasks. Instead they may infer in which 
direction an object needs to be turned based on object features, such as the orientation of 
the longest axis, or the position of its top (head) or base. For instance, if we showed a 
child a figurine lying on a table and asked the child to stand it up, the child may identify 
the figurine’s feet and then simply put it “on its feet”. The child does not necessarily 
need to mentally rotate the figurine beforehand, because a simple strategy to ‘bring the 
feet to the lowest possible position’ would lead to success.  
When children are presented with alternatives that can be distinguished based on 
features (cf. [2,65-68]), we cannot draw firm conclusions about MR, unless we can rule 
out such feature strategies, for instance by using mirror images, as suggested by Shepard 
and Metzler in their original study [4]. 
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Box 2. Sex Differences 
Research on adults’ MR has generally yielded a male advantage [69,70]; 
however, the underlying reasons for the difference are unclear, as is the age when the 
difference is first evident. Although some studies suggested that the sex difference is 
largely due to different speed-accuracy trade-offs, with females responding more slowly 
but more accurately than males [71], a meta-analysis with participants between 8 and 29 
years of age showed that sex differences are smaller and yet not eliminated by 
unspeeded conditions [72]. Some researchers have proposed biological reasons for the 
male advantage, based on findings that exposure to heightened levels of prenatal 
androgens due to congenital adrenal hyperplasia [73] or male twins [74] were associated 
with higher MR performance in females.  
In line with biological explanations, some MR studies [16-19] showed a male 
advantage in infants as young as 3 to 10 months. However, a majority of studies with 
infants did not show sex differences [14,15,20-24]. Moreover, several studies with 
preschool through primary school children did not report any systematic advantages 
(e.g., [5,6,9,13,25-27,75,76]), or even found higher error rates in boys [11]. 
Interestingly, a meta-analysis found an increase in effect size as a function of 
chronological age [70], and more recent research suggests that gender differences 
emerge around 9 years of age [77,78]. These findings raise the question of what factors 
may promote sex differences around that age.  
One such factor may lie in males experiencing more activities that involve 
spatial thinking compared to females (such as playing video games [79-81]). Another 
factor is suggested by studies [82,83], showing that instruction-induced expectations 
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about gender differences can affect performance. Neuroimaging results [84] indicate 
that negative stereotypes promote less efficient neural strategies and increase emotional 
load, whereas positive stereotypes are associated with heightened activation in visual 
processing areas and working memory processes. Surprisingly, such negative 
correlations between spatial anxiety and MR performance can be found in girls as young 
as 5 to 8 years [67]. The question of how biological, psychological, or social factors 
interact to influence sex differences in MR is currently unsettled [85].  
Running head: DEVELOPMENT OF MENTAL TRANSFORMATION ABILITIES 16 
Box 3. Motor Effects 
Research on embodied cognition suggests that motor processes are involved in 
MR. Studies with adults have shown that motor areas of the brain are recruited during 
MR with specific activation of the supplementary motor area (see [35,86] for a meta-
analysis and review). This area is associated with motor control and simulation, 
suggesting that participants may perform a covert motor simulation during MR. Such 
motor simulation strategies can be induced through training, as manual rotation or 
rotation of hand stimuli led to increased activity in motor areas in subsequent object 
rotation tasks [87,88]. Behavioral studies demonstrated that even training in seemingly 
unrelated activities such as juggling [89] or wrestling [90] can improve MR 
performance. Moreover, studies using double-task paradigms showed that hand 
movements that are compatible or incompatible with the direction of MR [91-93], or 
even just the planning of such movement [94], can have differential effects on MR of 
objects, suggesting that manual and mental rotations share common processes.  
Similarly, developmental studies have shown effects of simultaneous hand 
movements or postures on children’s MR [26,95] or mental simulations of physical 
events [96]. Interestingly, these studies have suggested that the effects of action on 
cognition decrease over development. Other studies have shown that 10-year-olds’ MR 
was facilitated by training to manually rotate objects by means of a joystick [97]. There 
is also correlational evidence for an association between MR and the development of 
motor abilities, specifically the development of motor control in 5- to 6-year-olds [75]. 
Research with infants has demonstrated that motor development, especially 
locomotor ability, is associated with MR performance [14,20,21]. Increased experience 
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with self-initiated movement may enable infants to think about spatial relations between 
objects in more allocentric terms. In addition to correlational data, there is experimental 
evidence that infant’s MR is facilitated by active motor experience [15,22], but such 
active exploration becomes less crucial as infants grow older. Active hands-on 
exploration may be especially beneficial for young infants, because such interactions 
may lead to a more stable mental representation of the object [98], which in turn may be 
more resistant to decay during MR. Overall, developmental findings suggest that motor 
processes play a functional role in the development of MR abilities and that MR 
performance becomes increasingly dissociated from overt motor activity, perhaps due to 
an increasing ability to perform covert motor simulations. 
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Box 4. Outstanding Questions and Future Directions 
If mental transformation ability is a common mechanism that is fundamental to 
successful performance in all of the domains discussed, do these cognitive activities rely 
on similar brain processes and share a common neural substrate? We know from 
neuroimaging studies that, even though some brain regions appear to be selectively 
activated by tasks requiring object versus perspective transformations, a much larger 
number of brain regions are commonly activated during both of these tasks [35]. 
Whereas much of the previous research has aimed at distinguishing these processes, 
future research could focus on commonalities and investigate whether an area of neural 
overlap can be identified (see also [60] for a discussion of neural overlap between 
theory of mind, perspective taking, and prospective thinking). Furthermore, correlational 
studies should address whether good mental transformation skills are associated with 
better performance in the other domains, and training studies should test whether 
practicing mental transformation skills would lead to improved simulations of physical 
events or other people’s mental states.  
From a developmental perspective, it would be informative to investigate 
whether mental simulation and the abilities in the above mentioned cognitive domains 
are related to the development of executive functions, specifically inhibitory control, 
which is presumably necessary for inhibiting current perceptual input and motor output 
while simulating alternative realities. 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. (a) Front and back views of the stimulus object, and (b) sequence of test 
events used by Möhring and Frick, with examples of possible (top) and 
impossible (bottom) outcomes (t = timeline; dashed lines = movement 
trajectory of stimulus object). Adapted with permission from [14,15].  
Figure 2. Schematic illustrations of hypothetical developmental trajectories, assuming 
a U-shaped (A) or a more linear (B) developmental progression of 
competency, measured by infant paradigms (Paradigm1) and paradigms used 
with preschoolers and children (Paradigm2). 
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Highlights 
 
x Mental transformation is a centrally important characteristic of human cognition. 
x On standard mental rotation tasks, many 4-year-olds perform near chance. 
x In stark contrast, infants are able to discriminate objects from mirror images. 
x Similar patterns of age discrepancies can be observed in other research domains.  
x Mental simulation may be key to all of these domains.  
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